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The Good by Way of The Right? 
Normative ethics is defined by two basic sets of questions: those 
concerning the good, and those concerning the right.1 In the former case, one 
seeks to know: How should one live? What life is best to lead? In the latter, 
one wants to know: How does one determine whether an action is right or 
wrong? What obligations do we have? Complementary, pre-modern 
philosophers (including Plato and Aristotle, the Confucian tradition, and the 
pre-Columbian Aztecs) held that questions concerning the good were 
antecedent to questions concerning right action.2 This is to say, they held that 
in order to determine whether a course of action was right, one had first to 
know what the good was. Some modern philosophers, especially Immanuel 
Kant, held that one cannot determine specifically what is good, without first 
assessing whether an action is permissible. The difference between these basic 
sets of questions, then, has given rise to an equally basic problem in modern 
moral philosophy: which of these notions is prior in the order of justification? 
 Some, perhaps encouraged by the complementary character of these 
questions, have hoped to provide ethical theories which would integrate these 
two sides without subordinating one to the other—to integrate, for example, 
Aristotle and Kant.3 Paul Ricoeur’s argument in Oneself as Another attempts 
just this. He writes: 
I propose to establish, without concerning myself about Aristotelian 
or Kantian orthodoxy . . . (1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) 
the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the 
norm, and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim 
whenever the norm leads to impasse in practice.4 
Though this statement initially looks to subordinate the right (morality) to 
the good (ethics), his second point makes the case that the conception of the 
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ethical aim (the good) must pass the morally normative test that follows in the 
Kantian tradition. As a result, it looks as though he hopes for an integration of 
these approaches, and this suspicion is underscored by his third point, wherein 
moral norms must return to conceptions of the good in cases of impasse, such 
as those in tragic situations. 
Yet a new sort of argument in the anglophone tradition of ethics, the 
opposed kinds of ethical justification thesis, forwards the view that the 
integration of these two approaches is impossible on logical grounds.5 Unlike 
previous formulations of the opposition of the good and the right, the sort 
that perhaps Ricoeur had in mind, the present challenge is considerably more 
difficult to address.6 
To explain, suppose that one is aiming to determine whether romantic 
infidelity to one’s partner is morally wrong. For present purposes, let us 
assume that it is. If one takes the Kantian approach, so that the right is taken 
to be prior to the good, one is arguing that among the premises in one’s 
argument, one must include the moral wrongness of one’s action. That it is 
morally wrong is known by an independent test, such as the categorical 
imperative procedure (hereafter, CI procedure), which purports to show the 
universal and necessary reasons why it is wrong. Schematically, one’s 
argument looks as follows: 
Premise 1: The partners agreed to fidelity. 
Premise 2: There was no coercion in the agreement. 
Premise 3: The unfaithful action is morally wrong (by the CI procedure). 
Conclusion: The action is impermissible, not good. 
On this approach, then, a statement about the good is found in the 
conclusion, not the premises. On the approach that Aristotle favors, the 
approach which holds that the good is prior to the right, one must instead list 
the good among the premises, and then conclude to the action’s rightness or 
wrongness. Schematically, one’s argument looks as follows: 
Premise 1: The partners agreed to fidelity. 
Premise 2: There was no coercion in the agreement. 
Premise 3: Infidelity would harm the other person (i.e., it is not good). 
Conclusion: The unfaithful action is ethically wrong. 
In claiming priority in the order of justification, then, one is claiming 
simply that a set of considerations, goodness or rightness, are part of the 
premises in one’s argument. Since something cannot be both a premise and 
a conclusion to the same argument without begging the question, it would 
appear to be logically impossible to combine the two positions. 
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 Two consequences appear to follow immediately. The first is general in 
character: all ethical theories which attempt to integrate a Kantian and 
Aristotelian position without subordinating one to the other are incoherent.7 
The second is specific in character: Ricoeur’s ethical project in Oneself as 
Another is incoherent. Whatever its merits as a theory of personal identity, 
then, it would appear to offer little for those interested in ethics.8 
 To avoid these conclusions, which are serious for Ricoeur, two paths look 
to be available. A first would be to reconsider Ricoeur’s claims so that it turns 
out that he does subordinate one approach to the other. If that were right, 
then his position would turn out to be coherent after all, though, and for the 
same reasons, unremarkable. For on this line of reasoning, Ricoeur’s is but 
another kind of Kantianism, and not an original formulation for right action at 
that.9 The other avenue available is to show that somehow, despite the logical 
problems, Ricoeur does manage to integrate an Aristotelian approach to the 
good with a Kantian account of right action. If this were possible, which it does 
not look to be, then Ricoeur’s “little ethics” would turn out to be quite an 
accomplishment.10 It might, in fact, turn out to be the first and only adequate 
integration of the two approaches, and it would, a fortiori, prove to be a novel 
and interesting ethical theory—one which is neither strictly virtue ethical nor 
deontological. Is the latter path open? 
 The present essay argues that it is. Despite its apparent impossibility, 
Ricoeur succeeds in integrating the good and the right, in producing an 
account of the good by way of the right.11 The result is not only that his ethical 
project in Oneself as Another is coherent, but that it is novel and ethically 
interesting. To distinguish his position from rival views, one might, for reasons 
that will become apparent in the conclusion of this essay, call it an ethics of 
recognition. Because the argument to follow is complex, the argument begins 
with broader conceptual backdrop to Oneself as Another. 
Norms from Narratives 
The primary argumentative task of Oneself as Another may be 
characterized as one of satisfaction: Ricoeur argues that human action can be 
understood to satisfy the intelligibility that we recognize as a narrative.12 It is 
in making this argument that norms enter as the final step, or final 
characteristic of what is meant by a “narrative.” It is worth pausing, then, to 
recall just what structure a narrative has in a textual sense, before turning to 
Ricoeur’s argument that human actions through life can also be understood 
as a narrative.13 
 In the first volume of Time and Narrative, Ricoeur sets out to understand 
the relation of cosmic time to personal, lived time, and he argues that “time 
becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a 
narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the 
features of temporal existence.”14 It is narrative, in short, that mediates 
between the impersonal sort of cosmic time that is intersubjectively verified, 
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for example in historical reconstructions of events, and the personal sort that 
we each experience. To make this argument, he must set out the formal 
features of a narrative, and then show how the concept so understood can 
play the mediating role he suggests. Because it is these formal features of 
narrative that are at work in Oneself as Another, the analysis will be helped by 
developing them in some depth. 
 Broadly, Ricoeur argues that a narrative is an intelligibility that 
represents the way in which events, experienced both in the first and third 
person, are coordinated. It has, he contends, three central representative 
moments, which Ricoeur calls types of mimēsis.15 He uses this term because, 
in his Poetics, Aristotle writes of the way in which a plot represents events and 
actions by mimēsis.16 Developing Aristotle, Ricoeur identifies three moments 
of a narrative intelligibility: mimēsis1, mimēsis2, and mimēsis3.  
The first mimēsis concerns the conditions that must already be in place 
for one to understand the coordination of events in an intelligible way. If the 
way in which events hang together may be expressed metaphorically (and 
more aptly in French) as giving them a “figure,” then mimēsis1 concerns what 
must be prefigured for their coordinated intelligibility to emerge. If one prefers 
Martin Heidegger’s terminology, Ricoeur designates the precomprehensive 
(Vorbegriff) backdrop needed to render the events of a story intelligible. One 
might make the point in the following way. In Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 
there are a series of attempted seduction scenes that serve as trials for Gawain. 
In the first, Gawain is asleep in bed and Lady Bertalik enters his room quietly 
in the morning. The text reads: “Then abashed was the knight, and lay down 
swiftly to look as if he slept; and she stepped silently and stole to his bed, cast 
back the curtain [i.e., bed sheet], and crept then within.”17 In order to 
understand why Gawain might be embarrassed, and the Lady’s actions quite 
forward, one must to know that in the period of the story, people often slept 
in the nude. This historical detail forms part of the prefiguration needed for 
full comprehension of the narrative, and so illustrates to some degree what 
Ricoeur has in mind. Ricoeur’s purpose in this portion of Time and Narrative, 
however, is rather more abstract, since he is interested in features that must 
be present for the prefiguration of any story (the practice of sleeping in the 
nude is, rather obviously, not one of those). These more abstract features, he 
argues, are its structural, symbolic, and temporal elements, and together they 
make up the moments of prefiguration.18 
Mimēsis2 concerns primarily the way in which otherwise discordant events 
come together concordantly as a plot. Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction, for 
example, rearranges the chronological sequence of events to such an extent 
that it is difficult to understand just what happened and to whom. One reason 
for this rearranging is that the narrative that emerges on account of the 
temporal reorganization is one of moral, rather than chronological, progress. 
The story, so understood, follows Jules (Samuel L. Jackson) in his conversion 
away from a life of crime to one where he sets out on a life in search of a 
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higher understanding.19 Vincent Vega (John Travolta) simply cannot 
understand Jules’s choice and tells him that such a life is that of a vagrant, of 
a bum. Their disagreement over this matter, moreover, stems from their 
previous disagreement about the significance of having been shot at point 
blank range and, against all odds, emerging unharmed. Jules sees the event 
as one of divine intervention, and Vincent sees only dumb luck. In order for 
otherwise unconnected events to emerge as meaningfully related, then, they 
must meet some conditions for intelligibility, and these are the facets of 
mimēsis2 that Ricoeur calls a plot. He argues that any plot, so understood, 
connects (he prefers the term “mediates”) in three ways: among individual 
events and the story; among heterogenous factors, such as goals, means, 
interactions, circumstances, and unexpected results; and, finally, among the 
temporal dimensions of the story.20 
The final representative dimension, mimēsis3, concerns the way in which 
the text refigures, or changes, the world of the reader or hearer. In Ricoeur’s 
own words:  
I say that mimesis3 marks the intersection of the world of the text and 
the world of the hearer or reader; the intersection, therefore, of the 
world configured by the poem and the world wherein real action 
occurs and unfolds in its specific temporality.21 
In affecting the reader or hearer of the text, the meanings which 
previously were only grafted onto the existentially relevant meaning the 
recipient had in mind, come into being in our historical, public world through 
the agent’s action. In short, narratives can change not only how we think and 
feel, but also how we act; even how we act habitually. This is the most complex 
of the mimetic facets because it does more than represent a text, but rather 
pivots from text to action. Ricoeur argues that refiguration first emerges as a 
process of circularity in reflection that leads to progress in inquiry. It follows 
through an activity of “reading” or actively receiving the narrative. Third, this 
reflection leads onto a refiguration of the field of reference, which finally 
makes for a refiguration of the time of action in one’s own life.22 
The project in Oneself as Another makes use of the same intelligibility, a 
narrative, but this time for the purpose of making sense of one’s personal 
identity. In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur hoped to cure the rift between the 
cosmic sense of time, investigated and verified intersubjectively, and the lived 
sense of time that we experience existentially. Similarly, in Oneself as Another 
Ricoeur aims to unite the sense of identity that we recognize as sameness over 
time, idem identity, and the identity of avowal and confession, ipse identity.23 
At stake in the first sort of identity is the sense of sameness that we recognize 
when, after not having seen a friend for a while, we reunite and remark “Gosh, 
you haven’t changed a bit!” At stake in the second sort of identity is the sense 
of sameness that emerges from saying, at a wedding, that “I do” agree to wed 
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and remain faithful to this other person until death do us part. Narrative is the 
intelligibility that bridges these two senses of remaining the same.24 
 Of course, to make that argument, Ricoeur must show that our human 
actions can be thought to satisfy the three sorts of mimēsis at work in a 
narrative: mimēsis1 (prefiguration), mimēsis2 (configuration), and mimēsis3 
(refiguration). The trajectory of his studies follows exactly this path.  
The first three studies aim to take the reader from an analysis of acts and 
the ways that meaning can be ascribed to them, to actions. The first study, 
following the path of linguistic reference, is able to discern how something is 
identified, but not how someone is identified.25 In the second study, Ricoeur 
turns to an analysis of speech acts, which identify the speaker reflexively.26 To 
integrate these partial results, though within a larger theory framework for the 
theory of action, the third study moves from the analysis of an act to an 
action.27 Briefly, he argues that if an act is to be understood in a way that is 
meaningful to human purposes, it must include within its description the 
intention of the agent. While “brushing one’s teeth” is an act, then, an action 
might be “brushing one’s teeth in order to avoid cavities” or “in order to annoy 
my sister.” Taken together, then, these three studies identify the prefigurative 
(= mimēsis1), conceptual background that must be in place to make sense of 
acts and action.28 What they do not show, however, is how actions, which self-
reflexively imply an agent, can be coordinated to identify a self. 
The task of showing how otherwise discordant acts might become an 
intelligible concordance of events is the purpose of the second mimēsis, 
configuration, and it makes up the subject matter of the following three 
studies. In the fourth study Ricoeur identifies three aporiai, or puzzles, each of 
which “points toward a specific supersession of the strictly linguistic point of 
view” that he has thus far been employing.29 The first of these is the most 
pertinent for present purposes, since it turns on the need to distinguish 
ascription from the simple attribution of a predicate to a logical subject. P. F. 
Strawson, who championed the ascriptive approach Ricoeur employs, does 
not provide the resources for this task, and so studies five and six aim to 
develop beyond these resources. In the fifth study, Ricoeur introduces what 
has been missing from any discussion of personal identity so far, namely time, 
both as it relates to idem and ipse.30 Finally, in the sixth study, he shows how 
narrative emplotment can forge a concordance among the discordant 
elements analyzed in studies four and five: time, agency, acts, intentions, and 
related notions.31 
This context shows that the “little ethics,” chapters seven through nine of 
Oneself as Another, completes the argument for narrative identity developed 
in the previous studies by finding a reasonable way in which mimēsis3, 
refiguration, can be satisfied by an individual’s life. One should recall that 
refiguration is the mimetic moment in which the text changes the world of the 
reader or hearer, where it intersects with the world of action. Given these 
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criteria, the ethical place these chapters occupy in the argumentative 
trajectory is in many ways expected. The resulting sense of narrative identity 
is one in which the coordination of ipse and idem is taken to be a rational 
selection of sequences of actions involved in practices, which are larger units 
of philosophical analysis than mere actions, since they include their own 
histories and standards of excellence, i.e., norms. The practice of basketball 
playing, for example, includes not only a set of rules about the game, but a 
sense of what counts as better play and what is worse. An ethical life forged 
from practices such as these, then, becomes a necessary condition for personal 
identity in Ricoeur’s scheme and, at the same time, completes the 
argumentative arc from the philosophical discussion of narratives to their 
normative implications for our lives—in other words, completes the argument 
about norms from narratives.32 
Mimēsis3: Action and Praxis 
To understand better how the normative features of narratives affect our 
lives, the analysis needs to follow Ricoeur in his development of practices, 
since it is these that serve a critical role in guiding our actions. It is this interest, 
moreover, which informs Ricoeur’s engagement with Aristotle, from whom he 
develops the sense of practice (in Greek: praxis).  
 In a departure from the approach taken in his Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle 
begins the Nicomachean Ethics with a discussion of the good.33 He writes: 
Every craft [technē] and every line of inquiry [methodos], and likewise 
every action [praxis] and decision [proairesis], seems to seek some 
good [agathou tinos]; that is why some people were right to describe 
the good as what everything seeks.34 
Aristotle continues to develop a conception of the good so understood 
as that which all things seek, i.e., as the principle objective for the hierarchy of 
all our other ends.35 There are two points about this hierarchy of ends that 
prove crucial to Ricoeur’s use of Aristotle. The first turns on a subtlety that is 
difficult to render in English. In the very next line Aristotle distinguishes 
between two types of actions: ta erga (productions) and hai energeiai (which 
may be translated as “performances” or “activities”).36 Productive actions are 
of the sort that yield a product apart from the action, such as a potter’s 
production of a vase. Stated differently, the end goal is external to the action. 
Performance actions are those that are actions (erga) in (en) themselves; the 
doing constitutes what they are, so that their end goal is internal to the action. 
This distinction is important for several reasons, and one is that it separates 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics from utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill, for example, in the 
opening lines of Utilitarianism, writes: “All action is for the sake of some end, 
and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole 
character and color from the end to which they are subservient.”37 Happiness 
for Mill, then, is the product of acting in such a way as to promote the 
happiness of the greatest number. It is extrinsic to the acts themselves. For 
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Aristotle, by contrast, eudaimonia is conceived of as the performance of living 
one’s own life well, as internal to one’s actions. As a result, it would be 
incoherent on Aristotle’s view to speak of maximizing this sort of happiness, 
apart from living it better, i.e., with more virtue. 
A second point is that an action as praxis may be distinguished from an 
act because, as is noted in the immediate context of the term, it is the result 
of a deliberative decision, proairesis, which includes its end, telos, within its 
arc. Like Kant, then, Aristotle distinguishes acts from actions insofar as these 
latter include the agent’s intention in their description. Unlike Kant, he takes 
(some) actions to be exercised as parts of broader practices, a notion that is 
not present in Kant’s analysis. It is this difference that proves crucial for 
Ricoeur, who writes: 
The first great lesson we receive from Aristotle is to seek the 
fundamental basis for the aim of the “good life” in praxis. The second 
is to attempt to set up the teleology internal to praxis as the 
structuring principle for the aim of the “good life.”38  
In taking praxis as the basic unit of analysis for ethical life, Ricoeur is 
forced to move to a larger unit of analysis than actions, which have so far been 
the basis for his account of personal identity. He also notes that praxis has a 
teleology internal to it, such that in order to carry out one activity, one is 
required first to perform another, and so on. To be a good basketball player, 
one must be able to shoot free throws reasonably well, and to shoot free 
throws well, one must practice, and so on. This internal teleology thus 
structures one’s sense of how to carry out the good life. 
 What is not developed in Aristotle’s discussion of praxis, however, is the 
way in which this internal teleology on its own may introduce norms as 
standards of excellence. Instead, Aristotle turns to a discussion of the human 
function to introduce ethical norms. To be clear, Aristotle’s method of ethical 
justification is one of informed common sense, one which turns on assessing 
reputable opinions (endoxa) and weighing them against the available 
evidence of life itself and the strength of better reasons.39 In book I.7 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle introduces an endoxon (singular of endoxa) of 
his own to partially resolve the controversy surrounding just in what the good 
life consists, namely that the human function is to make use of reason.40 It is 
this argument which provides Aristotle with a basis for discriminating among 
different ways of life. Yet, the argument has struck many as flawed, either on 
account of its logical structure, or on account of its use of what appears to be 
a prescientific bit of metaphysical biology. Ricoeur, not taking a position in 
this debate, circumvents it by looking elsewhere. Specifically, he looks to 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s argument in After Virtue, which uses the internal 
teleology of praxis itself to introduce ethical norms. 
The central arguments of MacIntyre’s which interest Ricoeur are those 
that appear in chapters fourteen and fifteen of After Virtue. Having reviewed 
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some of the challenges that modern moral theories face, and a tradition of 
discussion of virtuous activity in the West, beginning with the Homeric epics, 
MacIntyre opens chapter fourteen with the need to address two related 
conceptual difficulties. A first is that the list of virtues among the five traditions 
surveyed is so vast that is unclear whether there is any “shared conception” in 
content among the notions.41 A second is that structure of the virtues 
conceived in these sources looks to be so different “that we should treat them 
as embodying quite different concepts” of virtue masked by the use of a single 
term.42  
To respond to these concerns, MacIntyre develops an argument in three 
stages that spans the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters of After Virtue. In the 
first stage, he develops a background concept to which any of the virtues may 
be virtues of, namely a practice. In the second, he argues how practices so 
conceived make up part of the order of a single human life. In the third, finally, 
he argues that their normative source may be found in historical traditions. 
It is the first stage that matters to Ricoeur’s argument. As the virtues for 
Homer were excellences in support of a social role, and for Aristotle they were 
excellences in support of eudaimonia, so MacIntyre argues that virtues are 
best thought to be excellences in support of practices. This approach, he 
ventures, is broad enough to encompass the differences in content among the 
traditions, and specific enough to unify their apparent structural differences. 
By a practice, MacIntyre intends: 
any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to 
that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended.43 
Briefly, practices are complex socially cooperative activities, such as basketball 
playing or medical care, and not simple actions, such as shooting hoops for 
fun or taking cough syrup to feel well. Because they are complex and 
coordinated in this way, they have standards of excellence internal to them 
which do the work of defining what success in the practice means.  
Ricoeur develops MacIntyre in the following way. He argues that one 
ought to understand Aristotle’s argument for the human function (ergon) on 
an analogy with practices. As practices have standards of excellence internal 
to them, so a human life has a standard of excellent activity internal to it that 
Aristotle identifies as the human function (ergon), namely the use of reason 
(logos) in its practical capacity to organize our ends. It does not matter to 
Ricoeur’s argument, then, whether humans have a (metaphysically) peculiar 
function. One need only grant that humans have the ability to use reason, and 
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that its function, its standard of excellence, is set by historical practices of 
human practical reasoning. The excellence of this practice is called prudence 
(phronēsis), and Ricoeur argues that the capacity goes beyond the selection 
of means to ends to include ends in themselves. As a result, there emerges an 
interpretive and self-reflexive relation between the virtuous practical reasoner 
(ho phronimos) and her virtuous practical reasoning (phronēsis) mediated by 
a tradition. Finally, it is this circular relation, between individual and tradition, 
which constitutes how the narrative unity of an individual life is achieved, how 
mimēsis3 is satisfied for humans.44 It is this activity, then, that completes the 
satisfaction argument of Oneself as Another because it describes the way in 
which a person is transformed in maintaining an ethical aim. 
The CI Procedure 
Yet a difficulty remains: how does one know whether the practices which 
introduce standards of excellence into ethical analysis are any good? 
MacIntyre argues that the goodness of the tradition of which one is a part 
ensures its goodness. In a later work, he goes on to argue that one can assess 
the goodness of traditions by way of a sort of inter-tradition dialogue.45 
Ricoeur is, for reasons that are not stated, unconvinced. This has implications 
for personal identity. For if it is not clear whether the standards of excellence 
of one’s community are good or even coherent, it is possible that in living by 
those practices one might yet lead an incoherent life. It is to address this defect 
that Ricoeur turns to the Kantian moment of his ethics. 
To prepare the way to a discussion of Ricoeur’s modification of Kantian 
ethics, it proves helpful to pause, briefly, to spell out just why he thinks that 
MacIntyre’s approach to ethical objectivity, that is by way of the dialogue of 
traditions, is unconvincing.46 In his discussion of Hegelian Sittlichkeit, which 
for present purposes functions as a tradition does for MacIntyre, or as strong 
values do for Charles Taylor,47 Ricoeur argues as follows: 
For us, who have crossed through the monstrous events of 
the twentieth century tied to the phenomenon of 
totalitarianism, we have reasons to listen to the opposite 
verdict [of Hegel’s], devastating in another way, 
pronounced by history itself through the mouths of its 
victims. When the spirit of a people is perverted to the point 
of feeding a deadly Sittlichkeit, it is finally in the moral 
consciousness of a small number of individuals, inaccessible 
to fear and to corruption, that the spirit takes refuge, once 
it has fled the now-criminal institutions. Who would dare to 
chide the beautiful soul, when it alone remains to bear 
witness against the hero of action? To be sure, the painful 
conflict between moral consciousness and the spirit of a 
people is not always so disastrous, but it always stands as a 
reminder and a warning.48  
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Ricoeur is here concerned with the point, one supported by the testimony 
of history, that the spirit of a people, or their traditions, or the strong values 
of a social imaginary, are not self-critical enough.49 Ricoeur’s ethics aims at 
optimality, not ideality. In an ideal case, perhaps, dialogues among different 
traditions, or among people who live with different strongly valued goods, 
might be sufficient. But an ethics that is suitable to humans looks to what is 
historically supported in the best cases, and so is optimal rather than ideal. 
This history, Ricoeur argues, shows that another tool is needed so that the 
individual might take a stand against the common practices of one’s culture. 
This tool is that which Kant’s ethics provides. 
In turning to Kant, one finds that while interpreting Aristotle’s ethics 
presents a wealth of interpretive difficulties, Kant’s writings present at least an 
equal number. In his existing body of work, he expresses more than twenty 
not obviously equivalent statements of the three formulations of the 
categorical imperative, which are themselves supposed to be only one in 
number.50 The present analysis, then, will center on only one point: how the 
categorical imperative is supposed to guide right action assessment.51 
 To begin, it is helpful to distinguish the moral law, the categorical 
imperative, and the CI procedure. For Kant, the moral law is an idea of reason, 
and so it specifies a principle that constitutes action for all rational and 
reasonable beings, whether those beings are finite beings with needs like us, 
or not so constrained, as presumably God is and angles might be. Yet for 
beings who have needs, i.e., finite ones, they experience the moral law as a 
constraint. The categorical imperative is needed, then, to specify how the 
moral law applies to us.52 Finally, for the categorical imperative to be action 
guiding for us, it must be adapted to whatever our circumstances are in the 
order of nature. This adaptation happens by way of a procedure, the CI 
procedure, which takes the normal conditions of human life into account and 
finds its clearest expression in the law of nature formulation, which reads “act 
as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal 
law of nature.”53  
One might understand Kant in the following way, making use of the law 
of nature formulation as central for understanding the procedure for applying 
the categorical imperative to actions for their evaluation. First, one is to begin 
by describing one’s maxim, where this is understood as an act (e.g., “brushing 
one’s teeth”) including its intention (e.g., “in order to avoid cavities”). Second, 
one is to imagine a socially adjusted world wherein each individual is to act 
according to that maxim as if by a law of nature. For the sake of completeness, 
one may presume that Kant would have intended all agents to know that other 
agents were so compelled, and that the world had existed in that way for a 
considerable period. To follow the proposed example, all people brush their 
teeth in order to avoid cavities as if by a (psychological) law of nature, all 
people know that others do the same, and that society has existed in that form 
for quite some time.54 Finally, one is to assess that world for a contradiction—
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Kant specifically has in mind logical contradictions and contradictions of the 
will. What Kant intends by a logical contradiction is relatively clear, though he 
might add that one’s actions ought to be rational. It is of course impossible 
that I will to be in two places at once and in the same respect, but it is also 
irrational (and so a logical contradiction) to will an end but not the only means 
available for that end.55 By a contradiction of the will, Kant has in mind 
something along the following lines: Suppose my maxim were “to abandon 
my child to the wolves as soon as he acted in an irritating way in order to avoid 
that irritation.” In this case, I come to recognize, when reflecting on the 
imagined socially adjusted world, that I myself would have long ago been 
abandoned by my parents and would not be alive to will the maxim. My will is 
then in contradiction.56 To return to the brushing one’s teeth case, one 
recognizes that neither sort of contradiction arises, so that brushing one’s 
teeth is morally permissible. 
 An important observation about the relationship of the formulations is 
that on Ricoeur’s interpretation, the second and third formulations only 
articulate implications that are already present in the first.57 Thus, the 
formulations concerning human dignity, i.e., those which command that we 
are to treat each person as an end and never as a means, are modeled in the 
procedure. The reason for this is that, in taking up the point of view of the 
imagined socially adjusted world, I must treat each person of that world 
impartially. I must abandon my maxim as my own and assess how it functions 
in relation to all persons with equal consideration. It is only from that point of 
view that I can assess whether my maxim produces a contradiction of the will. 
Of course, were every person to act this way, then all actions would be 
consistent, and each would treat the other as an end in herself. The realm 
would, as a result, be a veritable kingdom of ends. 
 Despite his admiration for Kant’s strengths, Ricoeur finds it necessary to 
modify the categorical imperative procedure, writing: 
One has to admit that, characterized in this way, the notion of a 
maxim is unprecedented in the teleological tradition, despite the 
traces of universalism noted above. It is not actually the claim to 
universality but internal teleology which, in Aristotle, first 
characterized the notion of “rational desire,” and then, in our own 
analyses of praxis, the notions of practices, of life plans, and of the 
narrative unity of life.58  
In short, unlike the standard Kantian procedure, Ricoeur argues that it is not 
actions themselves which are put to the test, but practices. 
Although Ricoeur does not spell out what the new, reformulated CI 
procedure would consist of, it is not difficult to identify three capital 
alterations. To begin, the analysis would look not to assess a maxim, where 
this is understood as an act with its intention, but rather to assess a practice, 
where this might be understood as a collection of actions with their standards 
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of excellence. Second, one would be required to imagine a socially adjusted 
world in which all agents must participate in this practice as if by a law of 
nature. In this world, additionally, all agents know that all other agents must 
so participate, and the practice itself has existed for a significant period. Finally, 
one would put the practice to the test by asking: does such a world succeed 
in avoiding contradiction, where a contradiction is understood either logically 
or as a contradiction of the will? 
Dualisms 
The analysis has now set out all the separate pieces needed to understand 
how Ricoeur integrates Aristotle and Kant while accepting the opposed kinds 
thesis—an integration which, at first blush, looks to be logically impossible. He 
does this by introducing different orders of justification. To state the solution 
schematically, Ricoeur initially argues that the standards of excellence internal 
to practices are what shoulder the burden for virtue ethical evaluation. In short, 
Ricoeur can support the standard virtue ethical claim that “an action is right if 
it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically perform in those 
circumstances.”59 
This schema may be taken as appropriate for assessing right action if the 
assessment is restricted to the ordinary sorts of appeals that make up our 
quotidian lives. Yet Ricoeur also thinks that practices are themselves in need 
of evaluation, and that this cannot be done on the basis of the practices 
themselves, both on pain of circularity and on pain of depriving ethical 
evaluation of the ability to transcend its own circumstances and effect critical 
reflection. At a second-order, then, Ricoeur argues that one should submit the 
practices, which guide ordinary reflection by way of virtues, to the test of the 
CI procedure. And it is this procedure which will provide the universality 
needed to secure the consistency of our actions, which are given normative 
force by the practices to which they belong.60 
A relevant objection at this point is that Ricoeur’s account, having 
distinguished between first-order and second-order normative evaluations, 
looks to have bought consistency at the price of reintroducing a subordination 
argument, albeit a sophisticated subordination argument. Since Aristotelian 
assessments are relegated to assessments for ordinary activity, it is the CI 
procedure which shoulders the real normative burden. Ricoeur’s account may 
be somewhat novel, then, but it is best understood in the family of 
deontological ethical theories.  
Although this worry seems plausible, it misunderstands the argument on 
two different counts. First, Ricoeur’s ethics advances a dualism with regard to 
right action assessment. The (modified) CI procedure cannot be substituted 
for the evaluation of actions related to social practices. Neither can the virtue 
ethical formula, for obvious reasons, be substituted for the work of cultural 
assessment that the (modified) CI procedure performs. Additionally, it is 
largely because Kant attempts to apply his procedure to specific actions, such 
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as lying in any circumstance, that he supports evaluations that appear 
problematic to many (Ricoeur included). Ricoeur’s approach avoids such 
apparent problems because he changes the scope of analysis. Put differently, 
Ricoeur does not advance a subordinated approach because his answers to 
specific ethical questions will differ materially from either Kant or Aristotle.61 
 The second way the objection misunderstands Ricoeur’s argument is 
that it does not recognize that Ricoeur also forwards a dualism with regard to 
the sources of normativity (hence the dualisms in this title of this subsection). 
The Kantian deontological tradition is normatively monist, admitting only 
formal considerations as normative sources. Ricoeur does carry this much 
forward. But he also acknowledges that practices emerge historically in 
communities, and that their standards of excellence come into being from 
those communities. They thus carry their own independent values, and they 
are justified in light of the community of practitioners by the exercise of their 
practical intelligence by phronēsis. It is only because practices have an 
independent, normative source that Ricoeur needs a modified form of the CI 
procedure to address them in the first place. On both counts, then, Ricoeur’s 
work forwards a new ethical theory that cannot be identified with any proposal 
for ethical normative subordination. 
Toward an Ethics of Recognition—By Way of Conclusion 
The present essay opened with the worry that Ricoeur’s ethical work may 
be logically incoherent, or, at best, derivative and uninteresting for 
contemporary ethical reflection. This worry stemmed from arguments which 
have shown that ethical justifications that turn on conceptions of the good are 
different from those that turn on conceptions of the right. The reason for this 
difference is that arguments of the former sort appeal to a conception of the 
good as a premise in the argument for one’s assessment of right action, and 
conclude with a proposition about the right, while in the latter sort of appeal, 
the matters are exactly the opposite. Since a premise cannot also serve as a 
conclusion to an argument, any proposed integration of the two approaches 
to ethical justification are impossible on logical grounds. Such is the opposed 
kinds thesis of ethical justification, and Ricoeur’s “little ethics” looks to fall 
short of meeting its challenge. 
 What the analysis indicates is that Ricoeur does manage to avoid 
incoherence and irrelevance while accepting the opposed kinds thesis, 
because he develops an ethical theory that operates at two orders. The first 
order is virtue ethical, so that actions are evaluated in the ways that have 
become familiar in the contemporary ethical landscape, and these norms are 
introduced in the way that MacIntyre has pioneered, i.e., through standards of 
excellence inherent to practices that emerge historically in communities. In the 
second order, Ricoeur’s ethics are deontological, using a modified form of the 
CI procedure to assess the adequacy of historically formed social practices. 
Norms in this case emerge as basic conditions necessary to maintain a 
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coherent self. In this way, the CI procedure Ricoeur uses ensures that the 
dialectic of ipse and idem, the narrative unity of a life, retains whatever unity 
is possible for human lives.  
The apparent logical impossibility of Ricoeur’s project is thus only 
apparent, even though (or especially because) his project accepts the opposed 
kinds thesis. Critics of possible integrations, whether persuaded of the new 
formulation of the thesis, or the more traditional formulation, are thus 
confronted with the stark possibility that their ethical imagination has thus far 
been too dim; that other avenues for ethical reflection remain open. Ricoeur’s 
work is thus both ethically defensible and ethically interesting.  
The results entail some further clarification too. Even as a sympathetic 
reader of Ricoeur, James Marsh still thought Ricoeur’s “little ethics” was 
problematic on two counts. “First,” Marsh writes, “it may be that morality is 
present much earlier on the lived ethical level itself and not merely on a 
reflective, discursive level that emerges from the ethical level.”62 He explains 
that our outrage at harm done to others, cases of rape and sexual assault for 
example, are better understood by way of deontic principles than by ethical 
principles that turn on the agent’s own conception of the good. Even if a failure 
to exhibit moral outrage in response to such harms done to others corrupts 
my own character, the ethical onus of explanation for the wrong done ought 
to turn on the harm rendered to the victim first (and not on me!). Second, and 
relatedly, Ricoeur’s “recourse to the prudential and to convection as a 
compliment to universality [is laudable], but he may do that too quickly.”63 
Prudence would at least need preparatory guidance by universal principles in 
tragic cases, otherwise it might seem that murder and theft would be thought 
equally wrong when tragic circumstances prevail. 
The foregoing account of Ricoeur’s ethical dualisms clarifies the basic 
confusion at the heart of both these worries. One does not, on Ricoeur’s 
account, make exclusive use of either ethical principles or moral ones. Rather 
it is the universalizing constraint on practices that is always at once operative. 
We adopt practices of interpersonal sexual conduct, for example, by way of 
universalizing principles, and these make clear that cases of rape and sexual 
assault are morally outrageous. As a virtuous agent who has habituated the 
exercise of these practices, I cannot but express outrage at the harm rendered 
to the victims, but it is that harm to the victim that carries the explanatory 
burden of ethical assessment. Likewise, in tragic cases, prudence guides the 
search for new practices that would have to be tested by the CI procedure. 
The ethical is always guided by the moral, though at different orders, so there 
is no fear that prudence will operate unguided in these instances. 
 I would like to close the essay with one final reflection, one which 
suggests some grounds for titling the ethical theory presently defended, the 
“little ethics,” an ethics of recognition.64 Recall the character of the CI 
procedure in Ricoeur’s modified form. It remains the case that, even for 
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Ricoeur, in imagining the socially adjusted world, it is I who assesses whether 
the world fails to be consistent, whether logically or in contradicting my will. 
The worry which troubles the present analysis can be expressed in terms that 
Emmanuel Levinas develops: in the CI procedure, the same substitutes for the 
Other, but the relationship to the Other, the face-to-face relationship, is 
irreducible.65 In other terms, the point of view which Kant employs looks to be 
not only formal (an old complaint), but also (this is the new complaint) 
problematically ideal, made from an imagined, utopian view that is never fully 
realized on earth, and for which I alone take responsibility in judging. It does 
one no good to reconstruct Kant’s view so that the right action is whatever the 
ideal agent (or, following Habermas: ideal community of agents dialoguing in 
an indefinite period)66 would discern, because we humans do not ever have 
access to that point of view. As a result, the procedure, however modified, 
cannot be action guiding without risking a silencing of the Other. I shall always 
have to assume that I have spoken well for Them. It thus needs to be 
supplemented by a non-ideal view that emerges from the face of the Other 
before me. 
 Ricoeur was, of course, sympathetic to the basic Levinasian insight.67 His 
primary objection to Levinas, if one may put it this way, was methodological. 
Just as Heidegger sought to argue regressively (Rückfrage) to a sense of the 
meaning of Being (Sein) more primordial than the phenomena that Husserl’s 
phenomenological analysis uncovered,68 so Levinas argues regressively 
behind an embodied world to the face of the Other.69 Ricoeur thought any 
“short road,” whether Heidegger’s or Levinas’, would prove troubled.70 This 
explains why, in The Course of Recognition, Ricoeur writes that “Both 
approaches [i.e., beginning from the Husserlian ego or the Levinasian Other] 
have their legitimacy, and my argument here does not require us to decide in 
favor of one or the other of them.”71 
Given this methodological difference, Ricoeur thought of his task as one 
of recovering Levinas’ insight within the long road of hermeneutic traversal. 
He always sought to maintain the relationship (and tension) between the two 
points of view, between the ego-oriented and Other-centered views. He aimed 
for this because he thought they were complementary, rather than 
exclusionary if understood as part of a larger hermeneutic, reflective arc. Yet 
what is not clearly expressed in Oneself as Another is how that tension is 
sustained in ethical evaluation itself. While Ricoeur does write extensively on 
recognition and the relation of utopia and ideology elsewhere, he never brings 
those insights to bear on the little ethics itself. 
 With this background in mind, my proposal, which awaits full 
articulation in further research, is this: if one were to bring those Levinasian 
insights to bear on the little ethics, one might better understand Ricoeur’s 
ethics as normatively trilist, rather than dualist. These three sources are: (1) the 
historical practices that emerge from communities with their standards; (2) the 
CI procedure, which spells out the constraints needed for human actions to be 
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coordinated in a coherent way; and (3) the face of the Other who demands 
that I recognize the incompleteness of my categorical speculation. Navigating 
the relationship among these is not simple, and to those who wish for ethical 
theories to resemble desert landscapes, it looks disagreeably complex. Yet our 
ethical lives are perhaps more complex than we imagine, and a penchant for 
theoretical simplicity should not be grounds for suspending our practical 
reasoning. The final test for an ethical theory, after all, turns on more than 
parsimony, it must prove suitable to human life. Navigating the relationship 
among these sources is thus a task. Perhaps better stated, it is the task for an 
ethics which seeks to recognize all persons not only in the ideal case, but 
especially in our always troubled non-ideal world. Such an aim, then, would be 
suitable to an ethics of recognition. 
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1983), available in English translation as Time and Narrative, vol. 1, trans. Kathleen 
McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 18/3. 
15 By a “moment” I mean a non-separable, but conceptually distinguishable part. 
16 At the beginning of the Poetics, for example, when Aristotle is distinguishing the 
different species of poetry he writes that “epei de mimountai hoi mimoumenoi 
prattonas / The objects the imitator represents are actions” Poetics, trans. I. 
Bywater, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 
2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1448a1. 
17 Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, Pearl and Sir Orfeo, ed. Christopher Tolkein, 
trans. J. R. R. Tolkein (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), stanza 48, page 52. 
18 Time and Narrative, 108–109/54. 
19 A similar point could be made, of course, about Butch Coolidge and Marcellus 
Wallace’s relationship, though the matter is more complicated and so the present 
analysis prescinds from addressing it. 
20 Time and Narrative, 127–128/65–66. 
21 Time and Narrative, 136/71. 
22 Time and Narrative, 136–137/71. 
23 SMA, 138/114. 
24 SMA, 140/116. 
25 SMA, 39/27. 
26 SMA, 55–56/40. 
27 SMA, 73–74/56–57. 
28 While it is reasonably clear that Ricoeur’s argument satisfies the general idea 
contained in the three mimēses, in prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration, it 
is not clear that his arguments are even intended to satisfy the specific properties of 
each that he identifies in Time and Narrative. I do not see, for example, any attempt 
on Ricoeur’s part to show that the first three studies on act and action satisfy the 
individual moments of prefiguration, namely the structural, symbolic, and temporal 
moments, but I do not think that his argument turns on this level of granularity. In 
the earlier work, Ricoeur is specifically focused on narrative texts, while in the latter, 
he is looking only at acts, actions, practices, and persons. The categories developed 
for literal texts are not going to be appropriate for this latter domain. It is enough, I 
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think, that Ricoeur’s argument shows that human actions have the central features of 
prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration, and it is a mistake to think that it 
should somehow satisfy more than these central notions.  
29 SMA, 135/111. 
30 SMA, 140–150/115–125, 
31 SMA, 167–180/140–151. 
32 SMA, 193–198/164–168. 
33 Aristotle begins the eudemian ethics by disagreeing with the inscription on the 
Temple of Leto in Delos, which separated what is fine, what is best, and what is most 
pleasant. See Aristotle, Ethica Eudemia, eds. R. R. Walzer and J. M. Mignay (Oxford: 
Oxford Classical Texts, 1991), I.1,1214a1–1214a8. 
34 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachae, ed. I. Bywater (Oxford: Oxford Classical Texts, 1894). 
I have used the Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 
1999) for the English translations unless otherwise noted and in text citation will 
follow the established abbreviation: NE. Present quote NE I.1,1094a1–1094a3. 
35 Aristotle does not appear in these opening lines, however, to complete the 
argument. For a line-by-line analysis, see C. D. C. Reeve, Action, Contemplation, and 
Happiness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 227–234. For an account 
of the difference between Aristotle’s performative conception of the highest good, 
and a modern conception of the highest good that John Stuart Mill defends, see 
Sebastian Purcell “Natural Goodness and the Normativity Challenge: Happiness Across 
Cultures,” in the American Philosophical Association Quarterly, 87 (2013): 183–194. 
36 “ta men gar eisin energiai, ta de par’ autas erga tina,” NE, I.1, 1094a2–1094a3. 
37 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett Press 2001), 
2. 
38 SMA, 203/172–173. 
39 For a fuller account of Aristotle’s method see Johnathan Barnes “Aristotle and the 
Methods of Ethics,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 37 (1980): 490–511, and 
Richard Kraut “How to Justify Ethical Propositions: Aristotle’s Method” in The 
Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut (New York: 
Blackwell Press, 2006), 76–95. Present quote NE, VII.1,1145b2–1145b7. 
40 Aristotle does not appear to offer, in short, a foundationalist account of ethics that 
rests on the purportedly natural properties of human beings in the way that Phillipa 
Foot defends in Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). His 
approach is rather closer to the best account argument that Charles Taylor develops 
in Sources of the Self, chapter 4. Present quote NE, I.7. 
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41 After Virtue, 183. 
42 After Virtue, 185. 
43 After Virtue, 187. 
44 SMA, 209. 
45 See especially chapters 6 and 7 of his Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry.  
46 What follows to some degree diverges from some more Aristotelian appropriations 
of Ricoeur’s ethical philosophy. For example, I have in mind George H. Taylor’s 
analysis in “Ricoeur versus Ricoeur? Between the Universal and the Contextual,” in 
From Ricoeur to Action: The Socio-Political Significance of Ricoeur’s Thinking, eds. 
Todd S. Mei and David Lewin (New York: Continuum Press, 2012), 136-154. It may be 
possible to develop Ricoeur’s thought in the more Aristotelian direction, but the 
comments which follow, Ricoeur’s own, set up at least one significant obstacle for 
that direction of thought. 
47 I have in mind Charles Taylor’s arguments in the first part, and especially chapter 
four concerning strongly valued goods, of Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
48 SMA 298/256. 
49 I am expanding the argument to include MacIntyre’s and Taylor’s various different 
elaborations, since, for the present argument, it is their commonalities that are the 
critical point of contention. 
50 On this point see Kant’s statement in the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 
trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993), II: 421/30. 
Hereafter abbreviated Gr followed by section number, pages numbers from the 
Königlich Preßische Akademie de Wissenschaften edition of Kant’s work, then those 
of the English translation. See John Rawls’ review of the relation of the three 
formulations and their many statements in Lectures on the History of Moral 
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 181–199. 
51 The presentation of Kant’s categorical imperative procedure that follows is most 
directly informed by Rawls’ account in Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, 
164–170. Given the purpose of the present essay, it simplifies the process a little for 
the sake of clarity. The account is additionally informed by Onora O’Neill’s account 
in Acting on Principle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), Paul Deitrichson, 
“When is a Maxim Universalizable?” Kantstudien (1964), and Thomas Pogge, “The 
Categorical Imperative,” in Grundlegung zur Metaphysick der Sitten: Ein Kooperativer 
Kommentar, ed. Ofried Höffe (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klosterman, 1989). 
52 Gr, II: 412–414/23–25. 
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53 Gr, II: 421/30. 
54 Gr, II: 422–423/30–32. 
55 Kant’s preferred example, of course, is breaking a promise (Gr, II: 422/31). 
56 This is why Kant states that we cannot will the adjusted world with a maxim of 
indifference (Gr, II: 423/32). 
57 SMA, 245–46/210. 
58 SMA, 242/208. 
59 Ricoeur does not in fact use this formula, but his argument is consistent with it. I 
am here nearly quoting Rosalind Hursthouse’s formulation in On Virtue Ethics (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 30. Notably her work was written after Ricoeur’s 
Oneself as Another, and so would not have been available for him to consult. The 
formulation is, however, standard for the field of virtue ethics and so a reformulation 
of Ricoeur’s point in terms of the present field’s discussion looks to be necessary if 
his work is to remain current, and not merely of historical interest. I can also find no 
reason why he would oppose this reformulation. 
60 This is how the analysis understands Ricoeur’s capital statement about the relation 
of the Aristotelian and Kantian ethical theories: “I propose to establish, without 
concerning myself about Aristotelian or Kantian orthodoxy . . . (1) the primacy of 
ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of 
the norm, and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the 
norm leads to impasse in practice,” SMA 200–1/170. 
61 The dedication to his son Olivier, for example, makes clear that Ricoeur does not 
think suicide to be morally problematic in the way that Kant does. 
62 James Marsh, “The Right and the Good,” 232. 
63 James Marsh, “The Right and the Good,” 232. 
64 An ethics of recognition may have several different senses, even as developed from 
Ricoeur’s work. For a different approach to the topic, see Michael Sohn’s The Good 
of Recognition: Phenomenology, Ethics and Religion in the Thought of Lévinas and 
Ricoeur (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2014). 
65 Cf. Emmanuel Lévinas, “Le Même et l’Autre ne sauraient entrer dans une 
connaissance qui les embrasserait,” Totalité et infini: Essai sur l’extériorité (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijoff, 1974), 79. 
66 See Jürgen Habermas’ essay “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical 
Justification,” in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian 
Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 43–115.  
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67 In one of Ricoeur’s earliest essays that became source material for Soi-même 
comme un autre, delivered in October of 1985 and titled “Individu et identité 
personnelle” (now included in the collection Anthropologie Philosophique), one reads 
the following: “Je voudrais souligner, dans les minutes qui me restent, les aspects 
éthiques du soi. Je serai bref, dans la mesure où mon analyse conduit au seuil des 
travaux d’Emmanuel Levinas,” 350. Patrick Bourgeois, more recently, outlines at least 
one way that Ricoeur improves on Lévinas’ work in “Ricoeur Between Levinas and 
Heidegger: Another’s Further Alterity,” The Journal of French and Francophone 
Philosophy 11 (1999): 32–51. 
68 On this point especially, see Martin Heidegger’s argument in §§10–13 of History of 
the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1985). 
69 This is of course a simplification, but it indicates the trajectory of argument of 
sections I–III of Levinas’s Totalité et infini. 
70 This is especially Ricoeur’s point in essays one and ten of Le conflit des 
interpretations: Essais d’hérmeneutique (Paris: Seuil Press, 1969) available in English 
translation as The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1974). For a scholarly review of the criticism, see Sebastian Purcell’s 
“Hermeneutics and Truth: From Alēthia to Attestation,” Études 
Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur Studies 4 (2013): 140–158. Ricoeur continued to hold this 
position, and I think he was right to do so, until the very end. In Parcours de la 
reconnaissance: Trois études (Paris: Gallimard, 2004) available in English translation 
as The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), Ricoeur makes the following point: “Mais ce ne sera pas au 
prix d’un court-circuit entre le plan lexical et celui du discours philosophique. . . . Il 
m’a paru que le changement du statut langier du lexique à la critique exigeait le 
détour par quelques concepts fondateurs susceptibles d’instrauer la rupture entre 
niveaux de discours,” 48/24. 
71 The Course of Recognition, 246/154. 
